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SOMETIMES one is tempted to think of Christianity as a high-rise building that has been hit by an earthquake and is about to col­
lapse. Many have deserted the edifice; others huddle in panic; mean­
while voices of authority deny the rocking of the walls, forbid discus­
sion and dissent, stridently insist on old certitudes. If only there were 
some assurance of a solution in sight, it might be possible to let go of 
fear and face the crisis honestly.
“ But there is!,”  shouts a fireman from the street below. He holds 
out a wide safety net, and calls out: “ Jump!” The fireman’s name is 
John P. Keenan and the net is called “ emptiness.” The figures on the 
balcony stare down in terror—that net looks like a black void—better 
to clutch at these solid stones, no matter how they quake, than leap out 
into the unsupported air, entrusting oneself to some nebulous nirvana. 
The voices warn against the dangers of Buddhist-Christian syncretism, 
denouncing Buddhism as “ a sort of spiritual auto-eroticism” (Cardi­
nal Ratzinger). But the fireman’s persuasion begins to take effect. One 
by one, the trembling believers drop down into the net of emptiness.
If I cast John Keenan in this grandiose role, it is because his achieve­
ment is well-nigh unique, as a fully qualified Buddhologist, with par­
ticular expertise in Indian Yogacar a thought, who has drawn on Bud­
dhist insight to construct an original Christian theology. What we see 
emerging in his work is a new theological landscape, one that is con-
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sciously interreligious at every point, or rather 4‘intrareligious,” since 
the Buddhist and Christian frames of reference work together within a 
single integrated religious vision. He is the first theologian to reveal 
that Mahayana Buddhism has become structurally necessary to Chris­
tian faith. Without the background of wisdom and insight explored by 
the Madhyamika and Yogacara thinkers, the Christian kerygma fails 
to exfoliate its full meaning and remains truncated and opaque. In the 
past the thougjht-world of Hellenistic metaphysics provided an intellec­
tual medium for the unfolding of the meaning of Christ. This resource 
has now been exhausted, and continued reliance on it has a cramping 
effect, intensifying rather than resolving the crisis of credibility. Hence 
the sense that the discovery of Mahayana thought comes as a providen­
tial rescue. Its categories are not in tension with contemplative insight, 
and they keep iin touch with an attentive openness to the phenomena of 
experience; thus they can heal the split in Western theology between the 
abstract intellectualism of dogmatic debate and preconceptual aware­
ness of divine presence.
Keenan’s procedure is to reinterpret the meaning of central Christian 
texts and traditions in light of dependent co-arising (pratTtya-samutpa- 
da) and emptiness (tiinyata), as interpreted by Nagarjuna, along with 
the distinction between conventional truth (samvrti-satya) and the 
truth of ultiipate meaning ( paramart ha-satya). Another important 
reference is the YogScAra theory of the turnabout of consciousness 
from investment in imagined meanings to recognition of the depend­
ently co-arisen world in awareness of its emptiness. He sees nothing ob­
scure or problematic in these notions, and so can apply them consistent­
ly to the theological tradition, which has often invested in imagined 
meanings (parikalpita) and confused conventional with ultimate truth. 
The critical edge of this diagnosis is complemented by a constructive 
correlation of the presence of God with the realization of emptiness. 
This is something fully experienced only at the level of ultimate truth, 
where all the skillful articulations and conceptualizations of religious 
doctrine and theory fall silent.
The necessity of applying these ideas to Christian tradition, and the 
healing illumination they bring, are undeniable. Yet it may be that Kee­
nan, in the manner of many great pioneers, has moved too far, too 
fast. In bringing into conjunction the worlds of Christian theology and 
Mahiyana Buddhism he may be riding roughshod over the radical
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differences between the two, both in their epistemological and ontologi­
cal presuppositions and in their cultural and religious contexts. He an­
ticipates and refutes the more obvious objections to his procedure, but 
its undeniable validity in principle does not guarantee that its enact­
ment in practice will be plain sailing. Every single application of Bud­
dhist categories to Christian discourse implies a 4 ‘fusion of horizons” 
raising the most difficult hermeneutical problems. The strong affinities 
between the two religious traditions, especially in their mystical 
reaches, make it imperative for theologians to think out their relation­
ship. But affinities must not be taken for identities. The critical impact 
of Buddhist analysis on the illusion-ridden texture of much Christian 
discourse has to be pursued fearlessly. But we must be sure that the 
targets of the critique are properly identified, not underestimating 
the degree to which Christianity, too, is a sophisticated, self-critical 
religion. For a fruitful development of the questions Keenan has 
opened up, we need to stand back and pursue the inquiry in a more 
scrupulous and elaborate negotiation, keenly conscious of the difficul­
ties that rise up at every step. The resulting encounter may be less direct 
and global than what Keenan proposes. The Buddhist and Christian 
ideas and sources may play off against another in mutual critique, 
without any decisive overriding conquest either way. Their debate may 
take the form of a series of local interactions rather than a grand syn­
thesis. To the ambitious theologian that may seem a messy prospect, 
but it is more faithful to the concrete complexity of history and of hu­
man encounter.
Keenan has faced the crisis of traditional beliefs and categories and 
tasted deeply the scepticism and nihilism of the modern masters of sus­
picion. Yet I do not think he has ever been an addict of anxiety. He has 
found in Job and Qohelet a biblical correlate for the ordeal of the nega­
tive. The scepticism and despair expressed in those texts is overcome 
by a higher wisdom, which lets go of certitudes and opens up to the 
presence of a God who cannot be contained by human categories, a 
God who is empty. This wisdom can take the destructive impact of sus­
picion in its stride; where doubt abounded, faith abounds the more. 
The ideas of dependent co-arising and emptiness give a more lucid, sys­
tematic cast to this trust in an empty God.
Christ is the richest presentation of wisdom; we find “ in the pattern 
of his life, death, and resurrection an answer to the dilemmas about hu-
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man suffering, death, and the silence of God” (The Meaning o f  Christ, 
29). His life is characterized by non-clinging; his death is a complete 
opening up to emptiness; his resurrection is the arising of authentic con­
sciousness of ultimate reality. Such wisdom is appropriated in an ex­
perience of the overwhelming, undeniable presence of the love of God, 
manifested in Christ, an experience Keenan finds to be in deep accord 
with Buddhist understandings of awakening or enlightenment.
The dogmas that caused such headaches to generations of modernist 
theologians—the existence of God, the divinity of Christ, the resurrec­
tion, the immortality of the soul—are reinterpreted as events of the wis­
dom of emptiness. Christianity exists only to create an experience of 
wisdom:
the realization of an Easter enlightenment that can transform 
our consciousness and, with that, the world we construct 
based upon that consciousness. It is an experience of the 
emptiness and dependent co-arising of all our notions and 
endeavors that frees one for awareness of God beyond 
discriminative concepts and transparently embodies the rule 
of compassion in the world of hard politics. (242)
This experience of the world as it is, in its dependent co-arising, is iden­
tical with the discovery of God as “ Abba,” “ Father.” We must 
renounce all images of God as one who intervenes miraculously in 
human affairs; the only miracle is the grace of awakening:
The very arising of all things in interdependency is itself 
directly and immediately the presence of Abba. . . .Abba does 
not come to the rescue of bodily or mental anguish. . . . The 
Old Testament skeptics were right: Yahweh does not save his 
people. He allowed them to be consumed in the fires of the 
holocaust. (244)
More substantive and dogmatic ideas of God are idolatrous projections 
that close us to Abba-awareness: “ The point of the Mahayana refuta­
tion of the creator deity is that any idea clung to as ultimate is an illu­
sion, for any such idea represents a meaning constructed within the con­
ditioned world” (245). The God of Jesus is not posited as an object: 
“ Jesus as the wisdom of God embodies not an idea of Abba, but a 
preverbal awareness of ineffable meaning thematized as Abba” (247).
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There is a basic misfit between the reality of God and the convention­
al world of ideas and concepts: “ Ideas of God indicate their reference 
in terms of their dependently co-arisen context and cultural milieu. 
This does not mean simply that ideas are inadequate to present God, 
but still analogically applicable. It means, rather, that the presence of 
God is simply not amenable to conceptual expression at all” (247). 
This is a far cry from John B. Cobb’s process-philosophy claim that 
God is the supreme instantiation of dependent co-arising. Our words 
and concepts are made for the samsaric world. It is only by realizing 
their fragility and the fragility of the world they designate that we can 
open onto the silence of the ultimate. To find God: “ Attend not to an 
absentee gardener, but to the garden itself in all its immediacy and emp­
ty transparency” ; as death-of-God theologians saw, “ an objectively 
real God somewhere within or transcendent to the world simply did not 
matter anymore” (247).
The heart of Christian truth lies not (simply?) in dogmatic certitudes 
but in a conversion of consciousness:
The basic structure of consciousness is already directed to­
ward ultimate meaning and rejects God-conceptions because of 
their failure to ground themselves in that structure . . .  In 
awareness of the original structuring of consciousness ori­
ented toward ultimate meaning one becomes aware of God 
as prevenient and encompassing. (248)
Divine activity is conceived of non-anthropomorphically, as follows: 
“ the activity of the pure Dharma Realm in benefiting beings is like emp­
ty space encompassing all actions: although space is not purposeful 
and never sets about implementing any divine plan, yet it is the encom­
passing source for all beneficent action” (249). This is quite a convinc­
ing phenomenology of grace, which can detect grace at the heart of all 
processes of life, while allowing it to emerge dramatically to the fore in 
experiences of conversion and enlightenment.
For Keenan it is contemplative experience that is the source of doctri­
nal insight, not the other way round. He is critical of what he con­
siders the intellectualist, objectifying approach to knowledge of God in 
the “ mysticism of light”  deriving from Origen and sees it corrected by 
the “ mysticism of darkness” found in Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo­
Dionysius, which opens onto “ the mystic realm of meaning as apart
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from all mediating images and words, as distinct from the extraverted, 
confrontational knowing of imagined essences” (116). But Christian 
theology refused to let itself be founded in such radical mystical aware­
ness. Today, Madhyamika and Yogacara thought “ can assist Christian 
theology both in reclaiming the centrality of its own mystic tradition 
and in maintaining a valid place for theoretical systematics” (123). A 
radical sceptic would explain the heightened immediacy of contempla­
tive experience and its dissolution of the subject-object dichotomy as a 
projection of unconscious desire. But Keenan, though well aware to 
the human capacity for generating illusions, finds that negation is 
brought to a i halt at this point.
Recently Keenan has turned his attention from Gregory and Pseudo­
Dionysius to Mark’s Gospel. This text, the earliest of the Gospels, 
comes from a predogmatic and nonmetaphysical level of Christian tra­
dition. Its parables and cryptic narrative exemplify a style of religious 
communication that undoes at every turn dogmatic rigidity and bond­
age to convention. Recent commentary on this Gospel has been 
marked by a deconstructive radically which goes half way to meet 
Keenan’s Buddhist insights. He attempts to capture the resonances of 
the Markan (ext when heard with a Buddhist ear, just as others have 
listened to the text with Marxist, feminist, or psychoanalytical ears. A 
Lacanian psychoanalyst does not impose his interpretations upon the 
analysand, blit offers only a punctuation of the analysand’s speech, so 
that its meaning become clear to the analysand. Keenan’s commentary 
is just such a Buddhist punctuation of Mark’s speech. The result of the 
punctuation, however, is to interpret Christianity as far closer to Bud­
dhism than one had imagined. Some might say that the Buddhist in­
sights add nothing to what deconstructive exegetes have already seen. 
But this underestimates the significance of what is afoot here. Keenan 
applies to Mprk not merely a few scattered Buddhist ideas, but a sen­
sibility formed by the mainstream of Mahayana Buddhist thought. The 
fact that Mafk and his exegetes can be translated so consistently into 
the terms of that tradition reveals a substantial common ground be­
tween Christianity and Buddhism.
Such a Buddhist parsing of biblical wisdom in its various forms saves 
the biblical message from seeming peremptory or archaic and re­
habilitates it las a probing and well-grounded revelation of our relation­
ship to ultimate reality. It opens up a new way to making sense of the
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notion of God, one that may allay the doubts of the death-of-god 
philosophers. But it seems to me that the biblical God may resist the 
consequent application of Buddhist categories, and that Keenan may 
be underestimating the strength of this resistance. One problem is that 
the Buddhist conception of ultimate reality, as entirely ineffable and as 
excluding all distinctions and discriminations—these have validity only 
on the conventional level—seems to fit poorly with the concrete figure 
of a living, active, personal God, who speaks through the prophets and 
involves himself in human history. Can the biblical God be entirely 
explained as a thematization of a preverbal awareness of ultimate mean­
ing? Ultimate meaning, “ the emptiness of things in their inexpressibili- 
ty and silence,” seems extremely static, silent, monotonous, in compari­
son with the dynamic, communicative, and many-sided God of biblical 
tradition. Keenan might say that the simplicity of the ultimate is per­
fectly compatible with the variety of the everyday world in its depend­
ent co-arising, and indeed sharpens our perception of this variety. 
God-for-us would belong to this dependently co-arisen level, while 
God-in-Godself can be attained only in the ultimate quiescence of all 
fabrications and disappearance of all distinctions. This solution is 
reminiscent of Eckhart’s postulation of a pure Godhead, beyond all 
the shifting forms of revelation and the affirmations of dogmatic theo­
logy. But it may be that the biblical God undoes precisely such a vision 
of ultimate purity. The Buddhist demythologization of Scripture may 
be matched by a biblical dismantling of the Buddhist myth of ultimate 
meaning as a realm in which all differentiations disappear. Such bibli­
cal resistance to a Buddhist reading would immensely complicate the 
project of a Buddhist-Christian theology.
Keenan often appeals to ultimate reality in order to reduce doctrinal 
claims to the level of conventional truth: “ All perspectives are worldly 
and conventional, in the face of ultimate meaning which is perspective­
less and silent” (139). All religious utterances are contextual and 
provisional, and they function well only when they point beyond them­
selves to the ineffable ultimate.
Mahayana theology argues that all theological models (even a 
Mahayana model) are valid only within their contextuality in 
terms of the particular conditions in virtue of which they 
arise. In the words of Maximus Confessor, “ the doctrines of
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the Church are transcended by their own content.” (225)
One cannot insist too much on the fragile, hodological character of 
religious statements (hodos =  way); they are pointers, set in the con­
text of a practical lifestyle, to an ultimate mystery they can make no pre­
tense of defining or explaining. Yet there seems to be a residual tension 
between the biblical and the Buddhist evaluation of these pointers. 
Christian doctrine about God is not exclusively negative or apophatic; 
rather, it is resolutely affirmative or kataphatic. To associate the nega­
tive with the ultimate and the affirmative with the conventional is 
almost a reversal of traditional Christian priorities, though it is true 
that under Neo-Platonic influence Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo­
Dionysius, and Eckhart came close to such a reversal.
The doctrine of the Trinity is sometimes cited as setting limits to 
apophaticism in Christian theology, since it proffers objective state­
ments about the divine being in itself, which it would be heretical to 
regard as merely symbolic. However, when we look at the matter more 
closely we see that this doctrine is only a clumsy parsing of the biblical 
encounter with God as Creator, Word, Spirit. All it claims is that there 
must be some objective distinction of these aspects within the divine 
unity. (Of course popular and speculative conceptions of the Trinity 
have gone far beyond this, but without solid biblical or patristic sup­
port.)
A better objection to Keenan’s apophatic emphasis is simply the 
style of the Scriptures, their overwhelming insistence on God’s Word 
and the almost complete absence of reference to God as an ultimate 
reality best contemplated in silence. Biblical revelation and salvation 
seems to dwell fully in what Keenan would see as the conventional 
realm, while the dimension of ultimate meaning, in its otherness from 
this realm, hardly gets a look in. The critical impact of ultimate mean­
ing, as relativizing all conventional constructs, has to be transcribed 
into more positive terms in order to be applied effectively to Christian 
discourse. The Bible is very much a self-deconstructing book, but the 
deconstruction is not in the name of a purer ultimacy, but of a more 
convincing incarnation of God. In this context, is Keenan’s stress on 
ultimate meaning not perhaps a subtler version of the * ‘absentee 
gardener” approach he rejects?
The myth of the ultimate goes hand in hand with an epistemological
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myth of pure, unmediated experience, shared by mystical traditions in 
different cultures. Keenan distances himself from this myth to some ex­
tent: “ There are, I would acknowledge, no pure, unmediated meanings 
for the very act of insight mediates experience in some terms or other” 
( “ A Dialogue,” 17). Despite the gulf between ineffable experience and 
language about it, there is a “ symbiotic and reciprocal relation” be­
tween experience and doctrine (18). Now, if the heightened immediacy 
of contemplative experience does not exclude such pluralism and con­
tingency, does this not in turn undermine the monolithic view of ulti­
mate meaning?
Keenan grounds the variety of Jesus’s teachings, parables, and dis­
courses in a single transcendental experience of God as “ Abba” 
(Father). The application of Buddhist categories seems to smooth away 
the pluralistic perspectives suggested by the biblical text. Jesus’s para­
bles no doubt aim to produce awakening, in a manner reminiscent of 
Zen kdans. But is that all they intend to do? Is it even their primary 
aim? Jesus speaks more as a prophet than as a master of spirituality, 
and all the difference between biblical and Indian tradition weighs 
against any effort to translate his teaching immediately into Buddhist 
terms. But even if we do correlate Jesus with Zen, could it not be 
that the Madhyamika-Yogac&ra way of talking about ultimate reality is 
just the sort of thing that Zen snaps us out of and that Jesus too would 
have snapped us out of if he had ever heard of it?
Nonetheless, there is a substantial enough phenomenological core to 
Keenan’s correlation of Mahayana and Gospel vision. In both he dis­
cerns a powerful call to conversion from the mind of delusion to the 
mind of wisdom, a conversion that brings us into intimate contact with 
ultimate reality. Despite its hermeneutical short-circuits, Keenan’s the­
ology is consistently phenomenological; it sticks close to the experience 
of delusion and awakening as exhibited in both religious traditions, 
and all its categories are derived from this experience. In contrast to the 
speculative constructions of other Buddhist-Christian thinkers, which 
distort both the Buddhist and the Christian phenomena, Keenan’s con­
stant effort is to allow these phenomena to unfold their meaning in an 
unforced way. When he feels obliged to reject the archaic categories 
and images in which they have been transmitted to us, he does so not in 
view of speculative reconstructions but in an appeal to the phenomena 
themselves.
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In admitting freely that all language belongs to the register of conven­
tional truth and that the truth of ultimate meaning will always elude its 
grasp, Keenan brings a healing serenity to the epistemological crisis of 
religious language, and weans his readers away from the vice of “ at­
tachment to views.”  The polishing and refining of our religious lan­
guage becomes a functional affair, a matter of removing fixational 
habits of thought and reifying representations, so that the convention­
al language can continue to serve as a skillful means of awakening us to 
the ultimate.
His conception of the conventional language is not a monolithic one. 
Within the conventional, he distinguishes between purely illusory 
thoughts and thoughts which correspond to the dependently co-arisen 
condition of the samsaric world; in YogacSra terminology: between 
parikalpita and paratantra. He moves from a conventional religious 
language which is unaware of its limits and constantly projects illusory 
reifications of that to which it refers, to a self-conscious language 
which has taken cognizance of its provisionally.
If “ the conjunction of strategies to embody truth always fails and 
self-destructs before the disjunctive otherness of ultimate meaning” 
(The Meaning o f Christ, 138), why worry about the correctness of 
these strategies? The answer lies in the criterion by which religious tradi­
tions are judged, namely, their capacity to permit experience of the 
deepest reality. Religions can serve as pragmatic, provisional paths to 
spiritual freedom, or they can hinder and repress such awakening. Dog­
matic propositions, when divorced from their reference to spiritual 
awakening, lose their truth and their meaning. In light of this criterion, 
most theological discourse seems reified and alienated.
Religious traditions are dependently co-arisen. This means that they 
are human historical formations that have to be studied in their cultur­
al particularity. The absolutization of a religion or its credal proposi­
tions spells a denial of the law of dependent co-arising. Such ab­
solutism is a lie, which will issue in violence. Here we touch on the 
basic flaw that explains the tragedies of Christian history. When their 
historical particularity is seen, religious traditions are reassessed in 
terms of their functional effectiveness, as paths cut out within a given 
culture, enabling an opening to reality, or in theistic language, an open­
ing to God. f‘God” is not a rival to “ emptiness” as the name of ulti­
mate reality. Both are valid conventional indicators of the ultimate real-
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ity, which both inspires and surpasses all the paths toward it that are 
traced within religious cultures.
Keenan is not opposed to a theology of conceptual refinement, even 
system, as long as it remains open at every point to the experience of 
wisdom, as he considers the conceptuality of Yogacar a to do. The clas­
sical debates about the three hypostases of the one divine substance, or 
the two natures of the one hypostasis of Jesus Christ, have divorced 
themselves from such mandatory reference to awakening, or in Pauline 
terms, to Spirit. Their apparent logical coherence masks a profound de­
bility, for they no longer serve as effective conventional testimony to ul­
timate reality.
Here again I want to sound a note of caution. There are many valid 
ways of constructing a critique of traditional Christian discourse, in­
cluding the critiques of feminism and liberation theology. Keenan 
seems to put all his eggs in one basket, in his focus on the absolutiza- 
tion of the conventional. This critique is made to do work it is not suit­
ed to do. It gives rise to sweeping assessments of the language of dog­
ma (notably of the Christological doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon 
in 451) and of the role played by metaphysics in theology, topics of ex­
treme historical complexity which cannot be dealt with in a single mas­
sive stroke.
Can one accept the conventional status of language in NflgSrjuna’s 
sense, seeing religions as skillful means for opening up a path to the ulti­
mate, while at the same time preserving theological realism, that is, the 
claim that dogmatic statements have objective reference, and are not 
merely expressive or symbolic or pragmatic utterances? The old aware­
ness of the merely analogical status of talk about transcendent realities 
has been enriched and intensified by the modern experience of the 
historicity and culture-bound nature of religious language, so that the­
ology is more than ever ready to embrace Buddhist insights in this 
realm. Dogmatism, which posits an identifiable truth as ultimate mean­
ing, can be corrected through a subtler presentation of dogma, as a 
statement of truth which has integrated a sense of its own situatedness 
and relativity.
Our contingent culture-bound religious languages are skillful means 
for pointing to the ineffable. They are the finger, not the moon. Yet 
they retain the capacity, when set in the context of the entire tradition 
and lifestyle that sustains them, to speak objectively of transcendent
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realities. Religious statements are “ undecidable”  in a sense: we cannot 
pin down what they are saying in a language other than the very imper­
fect, ramshackle, myth-laden language which the tradition has given 
us; we believe the statements are true, but we are rather in the dark as 
to wherein exactly their truth consists, or how exactly they touch the 
truth to which they point. Religious statements are shots in the dark, 
but they can succeed in hitting their mark. They can be analogical state­
ments about what is in fact true, though the analogies are shifting, 
fragile and context-dependent in a manner not theorized by Aquinas. 
Keenan objects that for Aquinas “ theoretical meaning becomes not a 
symbolic weaving of models to express the ineffable, but an analogic 
and valid affirmation of what is in fact is true about God” (117). Ulti­
mate truth lies in the realm of mystic awareness; doctrinal statements 
belong to the realm of “ conventional, language-formed presentations 
of that awareness” (123). Is there not a danger here of reducing theolo­
gy to a science of the “ as if*  or of “ supreme fictions” ?
Referential success is not guaranteed for all time to any statement, 
for the statements arise within an ongoing historical struggle to articu­
late religiouslconviction, and the integrity of their terms depends on the 
concrete conditions of their production. “ Last year’s words belong to 
last year’s language”  (T. S. Eliot). A true religious statement is the 
product of a kairos; the decision about its truth-content always con­
tains, therefore, a moment of prophetic discernment. Yet none of this 
undermines the objective referentiality of such a statement.
God is not an object over against us, to be grasped in confrontation­
al knowing (a Gegenstand), but in another sense God is objective, in 
the sense that the ultimate reality to which the term refers is not merely 
a supposition. God cannot be conceptually grasped or circumscribed, 
yet inadequate concepts can be used in a conventional language to ad­
vance a judgment which can stand as a valid statement referring to 
God, for example, “ God is supremely good.”  To say that the conven­
tional status of religious language forbids us to speak here of valid judg­
ments and objective reference would inhibit and undercut that lan­
guage to a degree incompatible with belief that the biblical word is a 
communication of truth about God. Keenan devotes much attention to 
imaginary patterns of thinking about God, but there is a sober and 
modest discdurse about God which does not fall prey to these patterns. 
Objectivity is not a matter of imaginary objectifications; valid affirma-
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tion is not a matter of exhaustive conceptual grasp.
The critique of the role played by Hellenistic metaphysics in Chris­
tian theology has a long history, but the subject remains a difficult and 
delicate one. It is a mistake to underestimate the cogency and intellec­
tual force of the metaphysical tradition. Keenan himself draws on the 
best of Christian metaphysics—the apophatic reaches of medieval on­
tology and the refined philosophy of consciousness developed in the 
transcendental Thomism of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. Refer­
ence to Heidegger could serve both to complicate and to clarify 
Keenan’s stance toward metaphysics. Heidegger does not contest the 
truth of metaphysics, or the truth of science, on its own terms; rather, 
he points to a dimension of thought which metaphysics has been too 
busy to attend to, a contemplative attunement to being which is at­
tained by stepping back from the conceptual realm. The critique of 
metaphysics from this perspective need not involve any discrediting of 
the conceptual labors of the philosophical tradition since Plato. 
Keenan’s critique of metaphysics, unlike Heidegger’s, is largely an 
intra-metaphysical critique: he advocates a flexible, critical metaphys­
ics of consciousness over against a fixated reifying metaphysics of sub­
stance. In addition he performs a step back from metaphysics which 
has some remote analogies with Heidegger’s, insofar as he consigns all 
metaphysical discourse to the level of conventional truth, not to the 
truth of ultimate meaning. One recalls that Heidegger drew inspiration 
for his “ step back” from German translations of Lao-tse and D. T. 
Suzuki’s essays on Zen. Heidegger’s step back, like Harnack’s critical 
labors on the history of dogma, is not merely a shift of register, but in­
stalls a thorough interrogation of the entire history of the tradition, 
somewhat as in Madhyamika the conventional is critically revisited 
from the vantage of the ultimate. Does Keenan’s handling of the two 
truths facilitate such critical work on the tradition or does it simply by­
pass ancient tensions through consigning them globally to the conven­
tional register?
In his critique of Chalcedon, Keenan moves too quickly from a Bud­
dhist stress on the “ selflessness” of Christ to a rejection of all talk of 
“ nature” and “ hypostasis” in connection with Christ. He presumes 
that the conceptual labors of the Council were tied into the pattern of 
imaginary reification, neglecting the possibility of a more benign read­
ing in light of his own view that the language of “ self” may be reas-
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sumed on the conventional level. To be sure, if we accept the Buddhist 
ontology of the emergence of phenomena in radical interdependence, 
there can be no fixed substance of the humanity, divinity, person, or na­
ture of Jesus Christ. But this does not rule out a reformulation of Chal- 
cedon without any reference to fixed substance. “There is no selfhood 
to Jesus at all, for all human beings are empty of any self (at man). 
Christian doctrine on the person of Christ cannot then be expressed by 
attempts to define his dual nature or divine personhood” (The Mean­
ing o f Christy 225). But the doctrine of Chaicedon does not “ define” 
the natures and person of Christ. Its concerns could well be expressed 
in Buddhist language. Its stress on the distinction of the divine and hu­
man aspects of Christ consigns his humanity cleanly to the conditioned 
realm and his divinity to the unconditioned. The inseparability of the 
two aspects recalls the inseparability of samsQra and nirv&na in Ma- 
dhyamika.
Though Keenan’s reading has a constant critical agility, the sifting of 
gospel events between conventional and ultimate becomes rather 
monochrome, like the practice of some of the Fathers who ascribed 
some actions of Christ to his humanity, some to his divinity. Resistance 
to Jesus alwalys derives from attitudes that can be cured by insight into 
the two truths. People are fixated on the conventional taken as ulti­
mate; they cling to the defined boundaries of the conventional instead 
of letting go in faith; they are trapped in discriminations which impede 
wholehearted faith; they bifurcate the sacred from the profane, the su­
pernatural and their ordinary lives, mistaking the otherness of ultimate 
meaning for an identifiable other, a separate realm, rather than the “ si­
lent awareness of the emptiness of everyday living” (The Gospel of 
Marky 151). In contrast, the way of faith abandons the props of the 
conventional, in “ a wilderness conversion, modeled on that of Jesus’ 
direct awareness of God” (153). Faith is not insistence but expropria­
tion, not clinging but letting-go. It rejects the institutional temptation 
“ to reduce the ultimate meaning of tradition into the conventional 
framework of obvious necessities” (288).
In its central thrust this reading does capture much of the impact of 
the Markan Jesus. But there are elements in the Gospel and even in Je­
sus’ own reli^gious world-view that can be revised in the light of Bud­
dhist insight; (This will sound blasphemous to fundamentalists, but 
Paul and John encourage a critical overcoming of the Letter that kills
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in light of the Spirit that gives life.) If Keenan had made a greater eflfort 
to define carefully the differences between the New Testament and 
Mahayana contexts, he could have staged such an open confrontation 
between Buddhism and the Gospel. Bland appeal to the two truths can 
whitewash ancient errors, such as Paul’s approval of slavery: “ Paul ac­
quiesces in the givenness of his world” (The Meaning o f Christ, 256). 
Here a serious blind spot in early Christianity is whisked away and the 
door is opened to an over-facile method of coping with the Christian 
past (Vergangenheitsbewaltigung). Again, Keenan wishfully assures us 
that Mark “ is not recommending a replacement theology, whereby the 
new religion of Jesus takes over from the outmoded religion of the 
Jews” (The Gospel o f  Mark, 283); yet “ he will give the vineyard to 
others” (Mark 12:9) can have no other meaning, and to say it refers to 
“ the recognition of the otherness of ultimate meaning, of the falsity of 
clinging to any tradition, whether Jewish or Christian” is pure es- 
camotage. From the Buddhist standpoint we should be freer to recog­
nize the gravely questionable things in Scripture, such as this replace­
ment theology which lays the foundation of Christian antisemitism. 
Precisely because the Gospel-writers did not have access to Buddhist 
refinements about the status of religious language and about spiritual 
awareness, they fell into various dangerous short-circuits, of which 
Buddhism can help to heal us today. Keenan’s supposition that Mark is 
an anonymous Buddhist may cause him to miss the full healing poten­
tial of Buddhism for Christian tradition.
I wish he had applied the two-truth hermeneutic more cautiously, 
with constant attention to its problematic aspect, instead of using it as 
a catch-all net. His commentary is a perpetual hybridization of two het­
erogeneous worlds, sometimes effected by allegorical eisegesis that bibli­
cal scholars will find regressive. Even the most adventurous exegetes 
Keenan draws on follow the basic law of literary criticism, that interpre­
tations must be grounded in a plausible construal of the text. Comment­
ing on Mark 11:23 (the believer can cast a mountain into the sea), Kee­
nan writes: “ The depths of the sea symbolize the complete absence of 
human constructs, the emptiness of all supports for conventional lan­
guage” (276). Here the effort to coax Buddhist insight from the text is 
counterproductive. It leads not merely to over-interpretation, a com­
mon vice of recent Markan exegesis, but to completely tangential as­
sociations. A shorter, trimmer book, that would sacrifice such descants
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and siphon out the more persuasive correlations between Mark’s strate­
gies and two-truth theory, would serve more effectively to establish 
Buddhist-Christian theology as a viable discipline, capable of steady de­
velopment.
The resurrection is perhaps the Christian doctrine that is most uncon­
vincingly preached at the present time, and it is also the one that gener­
ates most anxiety, for if Christ was not raised from the dead the entire 
system of Christian doctrine collapses and there is no guarantee of eter­
nal life for believers. Discussion of this theme is polarized between 
“ realistic”  accounts that insist heavily on the alleged empirical signs of 
the miraculous event, such as the empty tomb and the appearances, 
and more “ spiritualizing”  accounts that tend to reduce the resurrec­
tion to a mere interpretation of the meaning of Jesus’ life and death. 
For Keenan: “ The resurrection stands as the breakdown of all conven­
tional linear events and the breakthrough to awareness of the complete 
otherness of ultimate meaning”  (366). Useless, then, to try to circum­
scribe this ultimate spiritual reality by insisting on empirical data or by 
giving a dogmatic definition of the resurrection-event. Resurrection 
means awakening to the ultimate reality signified conventionally by the 
entire ministry and passion of Jesus. The resurrection narratives, if 
taken literally, take us into an unreal world in which the laws of nature 
are broken at every moment. But if these miracles are taken as symbol­
ic representations of the breakthrough of ultimate meaning everything 
falls back into place. In all probability the laws of nature are never sus­
pended and apparent miracles are ultimately explicable in natural 
terms. The resurrection is not to be sought in the realm of magical inter­
ruptions of nature’s course, but in the realm of ultimate meaning, or 
what Paul and John call “ Spirit.”
“ Mark is not trying to demonstrate the truth of the resurrection 
within the context of imagined thinking, for no such demonstration is 
possible. Rather, the point is that Jesus is not there within convention­
al frames of reference, and thus not within the realm of words and judg­
ments that might be called upon to demonstrate his renewed existence” 
(393). “ There are no resurrection appearances because Jesus is beyond 
empirical validation. He will not ‘reappear’ even in Galilee. The resur­
rected Jesus can be seen only upon the awakening of conversion that he 
came to preach about, not in some supernaturally perceptible coming 
back to show his new glorified body” (394). “ Through his life and
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death, Jesus has resurrected the ordinary dependently co-arisen course 
of life, infusing it with his presence”  (395). “ His resurrection is an 
awakening to the eschatological wisdom of God-awareness, empty of 
any identifying image or idea, and to the subsequently attained wisdom 
of reengaged world awareness, with all the images and ideas needed to 
live and witness to the gospel” (397). “ There is no great day when the 
Lord comes in all his glory and gives Jesus* enemies what for. The es- 
chaton comes in the everyday suffering and the everyday resurrection 
from that suffering” (358).
All this sounds as if the resurrection-faith hangs on a very thin 
thread. Yet the thread is no thinner than that on which Buddhism 
hangs. It consists in contemplative insight, rather than empirical 
proofs. Matthew Arnold claimed that the facts on which Christian 
faith depended had failed it, leaving only the poetry. But for Keenan 
the true facts are of a spiritual order, the breakthrough of ultimate real­
ity in the figure of Jesus, which like the Buddha’s enlightenment is 
received not by blind faith but by growth in insight. As to the resurrec­
tion of the individual believer, this too becomes nebulous, about as in­
tangible as Buddhist nirvana. The voice of the Johannine Christ, assur­
ing us of the presence of eternal life, has the same calm authority as the 
voice of the Buddha proclaiming nirvana. But we can appropriate the 
message only by letting go of worldly or egotistic expectations.
Does Keenan do justice to the Christian claim that God is made 
known in a uniquely concrete way in the election of Israel and in the in­
carnate manifestation of God in the life, death and resurrection of Je­
sus Christ? Perhaps this claim, too, needs to be refocused and tem­
pered, or given a specific limited bearing, so that it no longer lessens the 
autonomous dignity of other religious traditions. The categories in 
which Keenan refocuses it may not be adequate to capture what is most 
concrete and decisive about God’s action in Jesus, which is not only a 
breakthrough of ultimate meaning but a concrete, historically mediat­
ed work of salvation.
On this point it would be illuminating to compare Keenan with the 
century’s most influential New Testament scholar, Rudolf Bultmann. 
For Bultmann, the resurrection is the transformation of the memory of 
Jesus into a powerful kerygma, a word of salvation, wherein Jesus 
becomes the Eschatological Event of God’s breaking into human histo­
ry. Eschatology is demythologized and existentialized, but for Bult-
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mann the kerygma remains primarily a prophetic address to faith and 
conscience, rather than an instrument of converting us to the mind 
of wisdom. His Eschatological Event engages with real history in a 
more positive sense than Keenan’s. No doubt Bultmann’s Lutheran her­
meneutics of the New Testament could have been enriched by Buddhist 
and Hindu attunement to the dimension of Spirit (pneuma) in Paul 
and John (and here the later Heidegger would have been more helpful 
to him than the Heidegger of Being and Time). Keenan, to the contra­
ry, practises an entirely spiritual hermeneutic, emphasizing the univer­
sal presence of the Kingdom as the “ power of awakening” (211), a 
present reality which no longer strains toward a future consummation. 
The Kingdom is redefined as “ the judgment of ultimate meaning that 
empties all conventional traditions and activity” (282); it is “ present 
and available at every moment, has no linear time reference” (267). 
But once the Kingdom message ceases to be a concrete intervention 
within human history and becomes instead a universal, ahistorical 
wisdom-teaching, it loses its raison d'etre. Of course we should avoid 
giving Jesus’ eschatological language an absolute status; it is only a 
provisional expedient; the eschatological in itself remains ineffable. 
Still, to make it refer only to enlightenment, in its ultimate and worldly 
aspects, goes against the grain of biblical thinking; the reader can resist 
Keenan’s emphasis by consulting the exegetes he generously quotes in 
his notes (e.g., 268). If Jesus was merely teaching timeless spiritual 
truths, he chose an extremely clumsy and cumbersome vehicle for 
them, and the best thing would be to jettison these eschatological 
myths altogether.
If there is a blind spot in Keenan’s theology, it is located here. But 
the fact that he is forced to a spiritualizing interpretation reveals how 
opaque the eschatological message has become in our world and how 
difficult it is to retrieve the concrete historical meaning of the Gospel 
call. Buddhism puts great pressure on Christians to dissolve this aspect 
of their tradition as an archaic positivism. Meanwhile, Christians find 
themselves incapable of addressing to Buddhists a concrete kerygma of 
the Kingdom of God. But in time both Buddhists and Christians may 
rediscover the distinctive strength of Christianity, its prophetic engage­
ment with concrete history.
Meanwhile, Keenan has opened up a Buddhist way of reading the 
Gospel that may today be more practicable in the West than standard
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Christian readings, for it bypasses many thorny theological conun­
drums. The appropriation of Christ as wisdom-event is one of the most 
fundamental demands of the Gospel. All the dogmatic claims that have 
divided Christians and Jews, and split the Christian community itself, 
can be handled more lucidly and irenically if this foundation is first put 
in place. There is another, even more fundamental demand of the 
Gospel that Buddhism sheds less light on, namely the concrete message 
of a historical event of salvation to be received by faith. Here we still 
stumble on profound differences and unresolved problems of interpre­
tation and articulation.
My thought has been profoundly influenced by John Keenan’s writ­
ings over the last ten years, to the point that in arguing with him I have 
the impression that I am arguing with himself. He is better armed than 
I to move boldly to the frontiers of Christian-Buddhist theology. I am 
more inclined to worry about the hermeneutics and methodology of 
the enterprise. I have no doubt that the enterprise itself is a great one, 
and that it is laying the ground for a future religious vision, one that 
can elicit an adult and vibrant faith, far beyond the sectarian panic and 
dogmatism of the churches today. We may anticipate that Christianity 
will emerge from its embrace of Buddhism altered even more profound­
ly than Keenan’s writing suggests, though not thereby diminished.
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